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A Family Tale:
Behavioral Finance and the Seagram-Vivendi Merger
by Lawrence J. Raifinan, J.D., Ph.D*.

The use of cognitive heuristics to explain the Seagram-Vivendi merger
provides more valuable insights than those found in traditionalpop psychology
or economic decision analysis.
The famed 22 foot high "Le Tricome" Picasso curtain painting in the
Seagram Building, visible from New York City's Park Avenue since 1959,
along with the entire Joseph E. Seagram and Sons modem art collection, is on
the auction block. The $15 million art collection is no longer regarded as a
"strategic asset" in Vivendi Universal's portfolio, and will be sold as part of its
downsizing efforts in response to Vivendi's serious financial troubles. Vivendi
absorbed Seagram in a merger several years ago at the height of the frenetic
communications market mania. Ms. Phyllis Lambert, the daughter of Samuel
Bronfinan, the Seagram patriarch, commented in the New York Times on
December 12, 2002', "This is part of a Greek tragedy" for the Bronfman family,
"I'm heartbroken." She was active in the Seagram Building design and
formation of the art collection. Her sentiments were echoed by other prominent
New Yorkers, including Robert A. M. Stem, Dean of the Yale School of
Architecture, who noted that losing the "Le Tricome" by Picasso from the
Seagram Building "would be like taking the ceiling off the Sistine Chapel."
The media in Canada and the United States have been drawn to the
dramatic rise and disastrous fall of one of Canada's preeminent families of
finance. Magazine articles are fond of quoting Samuel Bronfman's now
prophetic comment made to Fortune Magazine in 1966: "...shift sleeves to
"The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of David Miller, Esq. in developing
the ideas of
this article. Mr. Miller is Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of Rogers Communications
Inc. Lawrence J. Raifman is a lawyer and psychologist who graduated with ajoint degree from the
University of Arizona. He is presently an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Department of
Psychology at Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Raifman teaches a course in Behavioral Finance, is
Director of the Office of Forensic Services at Springfield Hospital Center in Sykesville, Maryland,
and has a forensic psychology private practice in Baltimore and Westminster, Maryland.
'Carol Vogel, "Seagram's Owners Are Preparing Its Art Collection for Auction," New York Times
December 12, 2002, p. BI.
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shirtsleeves in three generations. I'm worried about the third generation.
Empires have come and gone." Samuel Bronfinan built a business empire in
North America during prohibition more than two generations ago, when he sold
Canadian whiskey to U.S. bootleggers. Bronfman succeeded in taking as much
as twenty percent of the American liquor market, expanding the Montreal based
company with name brand whiskey like Chivas Regal and Seagram's V.O.
Seagram prospered with sustained growth over the next generation under his
son, Edgar Bronfinan, Senior. Edgar Bronfinan, Jr.'s decisions made just prior
to the bursting of the Internet bubble caused his family the loss of billions.
When "exuberance" was replaced by fear, Edgar Bronfinan, Jr. and his family
felt the loss more so than most. Edgar Bronfman, Sr. considered the real tragedy
to be, not the loss of wealth, estimated as being a drop from $6.9 billion to $1
billion, but the failure of judgment. "Not to pooh-pooh the money, but that's
not the real disaster. The real disaster is bad judgment. We took something my
father had built and my son converted into something, which was really
dynamic, and put it in with these gu's to get the kind of size we needed. And
suddenly it blew up in our faces."
The New York Magazine was harshly
critical, writing somewhat insensitively that "Edgar Bronfian, Jr. was possibly
the stupidest person in the media business."
In sync with Phyllis Lambert, the popular media depicts the
Bronfnan's downfall as a modem morality play. A Fortune article noted, "The
oracles predicted his (Edgar Bronfinan Jr.'s) disgrace, he devoted his career to
preventing it, and it's happened anyway, because of his own action."3 Brian
Milner's article on the Bronfinan financial failure entitled "Broken Spirits" is
typical of the present genre. Mr. Milner could not resist the temptation to overweight personality and family dynamics when writing about the Bronfinans.
The result is an inherently entertaining presentation, centered on a psychological
analysis of the Bronfinan family, putting special emphasis upon family
generational conflicts. It is a formula the public is comfortable with. Our pop
psychology culture has begun to pay attention to finance. CEOs are the new
celebrities, showcased on financial cable stations like CNBC, business talk
shows, print media, and in the popular press. Their current problems, both at
home and at work, provide an unending series of human-interest stories. Media
interest currently runs to family feuds, generational conflicts, and disordered
thinking due to personality failings. Over the past three generations, the
Bronfinans displayed the full panoply of human foibles. Reporting on their
success and failure took place in the context of a public's near obsession with
finance during the Internet craze.
As entertaining as this "tabloid press" coverage is, a more valuable
psychology of finance exists which is different from pop finance psychology.
The finance psychology I am speaking of is behavioral finance. Behavioral
finance has captured the imagination of many prestigious university finance
2

Brian Milner, "Broken Spirits," in R.O.B. Magazine, September 2002.

3 Devin Leonard, "The Bronfman Saga: From Rags to Riches to... ", Fortune Magazine Vol. 146,

No. 11, (November 2002), p. 106.
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scholars and high profile money managers. Behavioral finance is equally as
interesting as pop finance psychology, though more beneficial because it offers
insights that can be useful. Rather than merely a recounting of attention-getting
human tragedy, like a wreck on the road, behavioral finance provides an analysis
of practical value.
Psychological contributions to understanding decision-making implicit
in behavioral finance were recognized worldwide when a Princeton University
psychologist won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. In October
2002, Daniel Kahneman, Ph.D., was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economic Sciences for his work in testing the limits of the standard economic
theory of choice in predicting the actions of real people. Basically, Kahneman
discovered a discrepancy between the optimal (normative) decision making
expected by economic theory and the actual (descriptive) decisions taking place
in the real world. Together with Amos Tversky, Ph.D., who died in 1996, Daniel
Kahneman completed groundbreaking work that challenged assumptions of
rationality and self-interest choices, long assumed in economics. Kahneman and
Tversky proposed that decision makers do not fully compare decision options,
probabilities, and utilities prior to making decisions as called for by optimal
rules of decision-making. Rather they use mental short cuts (heuristics), and
their decisions become sub-optimal, boundedly rational. Building upon the
ground-breaking work of H. Simon (a 1978 Nobel Prize Winner in Economics),
Kahneman sparked an investigation into human strategies of reasoning and the
use of heuristics to resolve complex judgment tasks. He found that people have
"optimistic overconfidence," a condition in which people generally believe that
they can do what most people are not able to do. Just as not everyone is an
above average driver, not everyone is capable of being a success in business or
the markets.
Behavioral finance assumes there are no optimal decisions in business.
Decisions are impacted by cognitive heuristics or mental shortcuts, and subtle
personal biases, which are influenced by the prior pattern of decisions by the
decision maker and uncertainty and ever-changing contingencies of the decision
context. Kahneman and Tversky developed "prospect theory," a theory of
human decision-making has been characterized by three key features: (1)
people are risk averse---they are unhappier with losses than pleased with gains;
(2) people are willing to take risks to avoid realizing (paper) losses; and (3)
losses loom larger than gains in human judgment when the prospects of either
are equally probable.4
Behavioral finance researchers, interested in explaining many market
anomalies, have generated a new descriptive vocabulary to explain investment
decision heuristics. The endowment effect, representativeness heuristic, myopic
loss aversion, disposition effect and house money effect are a few examples.
This often occurs at the time of a scientific paradigm shift. In addition to
cognitive psychological constructs, behavioral finance borrows heavily from
4 For an introduction into prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman and Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky

(eds. 1982) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases Oxford Press.
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social psychology to explain marketplace manias and volatility. What is needed
is an alternative to journalists who fancy themselves as clinical psychologist
experts, analyzing celebrity CEOs.
Behavioral finance reassigns the focus to the decision, and secondarily
to the decision-maker, and only peripherally to the role of remote factors like
parent/child relationships. Thus, Edgar Bronfiman, Jr.'s decision to merge with
Vivendi in 2000 was the critical event. It eventually had very real adverse
consequences for Seagram, its employees, the media industry, the Bronfman
family, and the market. He should have decided to forego the merger, but he did
not. What caused him choose to merge with Vivendi? Although it is true that
being a third generation Bronfman made him anxious to succeed and honor the
Bronfnan family's legacy, this fact does not really explain the decision to merge
with Vivendi. To label the decision a modem day "Greek tragedy" is more
distracting than informative; it is more important to discern how the decision
was made, and what can we learn from it.
This article applies a behavioral finance analysis in an attempt to
understand how the decisions of Edgar Bronfmnan, Jr. were made just at the time
the Internet bubble burst. Edgar Bronfinan, Jr. embarked on a treacherous
venture in the communications/media industry with disastrous results. The
insights of behavioral finance offer an explanation for his decision errors, and
guidance to business leaders seeking ways to minimize to prevent similar
mistakes from occurring in the future.
Edgar Bronfman's Decision Edgar, Jr. was twenty-six years old when he first began to work at
Seagram in 1982. His resume read more like that of a sixties hipster than a
budding executive. Edgar Jr. wanted to become a movie producer, and, rather
than go to college, he made a film with Jack Nicholson in 1982 called "The
Border." He also was a songwriter. His father, Edgar Sr., whose family had
control of 38.5% of Seagram, put him in line to become chief executive officer
of the company after his Hollywood career fizzled, four years later. He could
have chosen among ten other members of his Bronfman generation, but Edgar
Sr. selected Edgar, Jr. over Sam, his first child. At the time, Seagram had sales
of $2.9 Billion, and profits of nearly $ 75 million.
Edgar, Jr. became the third generation Bronfinan to head the company.
His ascension to Seagram's CEO throne naturally raised doubts about whether it
was appropriate for his father to put him into a job that he had not earned. Was
he to be a wealthy dilettante or successful in his own right? After all, Sam
Bronfnan established family trusts in the names of all his heirs. Edgar, Sr. and
Charles, his brother, together received sixty percent of the estate. Eventually
5 In actuality many others including the members of the Board of Seagram as well as the company's
business and financial advisors appear to have also reached the conclusion that a merger with
Vivendi was a reasonable and prudent business strategy.
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Edgar, Jr. and his siblings would have this wealth. Edgar, Sr., during his
twenty-three year tenure as CEO, diversified Seagram's business beginning in
1981 by joining with Dupont in its effort to take over Conoco. As a result,
following the successful takeover by Dupont, Seagram acquired twenty percent
of Dupont, at that time valued at over $300 million. (By the time Edgar Jr. sold
Dupont's stock, Dupont was contributing nearly $300 million per year in
dividends to Seagram.) Edgar, Sr. had distinguished himself as a capable,
qualified CEO prior to turning the reins over to his son.
Edgar, Jr. acted decisively to mute his critics. He ended Seagram's
relationship with Lord Calvert and Wolfschmidt vodka brands, and redoubled
his efforts to grow profits on brands like Chivas Regal, which had higher profit
margins. He won the right to distribute the Swedish vodka, Absolut. He bought
Tropicana, the American orange juice concern, and within a decade divested it
to PepsiCo for a $1.1 billion profit. Edgar, Jr. had achieved success in the top
job. His stature had grown to the point that he had nearly matched his father's.
What was to be next? Consistent with Edgar, Jr.'s prior attraction to
Hollywood, he decided he was going to become a media mogul. He reasoned
that by the mid 1990's liquor consumption was on the skids, and entertainment
had an unlimited growth potential. In 1995, Edgar Jr. zeroed out Seagram's
Dupont investment for $8 billion, and used $5.5 billion to purchase 80 percent
of MCA, the owner of movie, music, theme park and television assets. He was
especially attracted to MCA because it owned Universal Studios and theme
parks. He also purchased from Time Warner the Interscope, Snoop Dogg's rap
music label, for $200 million. In effect, Edgar, Jr.'s 1995 decision to sell
Dupont and buy MCA was his bid to transform Seagram into a media giant like
Disney or Time Warner.
In his article, Mr. Milner places undue emphasis upon personal family
relations as the primary motivation for this decision. Milner needs to be
reminded as Sonny Corleone was in the Godfather movie: "[iut's not personal,
it's strictly business." Milner leads us astray by drawing parallels from Edgar,
Jr.'s bid to take over MCA to that of his father's failed bid a generation ago to
buy MGM. Just as Sam Bronfinan complained to Edgar, Sr. that his interest in
Hollywood was misguided, Edgar, Sr. may well have wondered whether Edgar,
Jr. was seduced by Hollywood. Like his father a generation before him, Edgar,
Jr. likely brushed off the speculation.
Such psychological factors are not relevant. Nor was it appropriate to
read into an analysis of Edgar Jr.'s decision to buy MCA his father's
unwillingness to second-guess his son. Edgar Sr. had chosen to avoid his own
father's way of being over-controlling, according to Milner. He speculated that
Edgar Sr. approved Edgar Jr.'s decision to sell Dupont shares and buy MCA
because he did not want to be like Sam. This diminishes the legitimacy of Edgar,
Jr.'s business purpose. Perhaps David Leonard in FortuneMagazine got it right
when he speculated that Edgar, Sr. genuinely did not care about the sale of
Dupont, and, agreeing with Edgar, Jr. that it was a very boring company,
understood his son's purpose in moving on. Also much has been made of the
relationship between Edgar, Sr. and his brother, Charles. Charles Bronfman had
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been receptive when his older brother, Edgar, Sr. was made CEO of Seagram.
Charles was content to remain in Montreal and spend his time running the local
baseball team, the Expos.
Charles reportedly opposed the shift to entertainment but remained
unwilling to engage in a family disagreement over Edgar, Jr.'s decision. Charles
considered the family investment in Dupont to be a safe haven where the
family's wealth would be secure into the future. His silence and the eventual
disastrous consequences of Edgar, Jr.'s decision to buy MCA and later merge
with Vivendi led to bad blood between the two brothers. Was Edgar Jr.'s
purpose to succeed as an entertainment mogul where his father, Edgar, Sr. had
once failed many years before? Did Edgar, Jr. need to move the business into
new territory so as to define his reign as distinct from his father's and
grandfather's? Why wasn't relying on the dividends from Dupont sufficient?
Attributing psychological, personal or family motivations to Edgar, Jr.'s
decision to become a media mogul, though entertaining itself, is shallow and
uninformed.
What is getting lost is the signal in all this noise. What is needed is an
assessment of Edgar, Jr.'s decision, i.e. the weight given to the risks associated
with the entertainment business, and the pros and cons of risking the family
wealth on this venture. Behavioral finance analysis of Edgar, Jr.'s decision to
sell Dupont and buy MCA is distinct from the analysis of family dynamics
presented by Milner and others, and more appropriately psychological in nature.
Edgar, Jr. was intending to improve the bottom line of a family controlled
business. Sure, he was ambitious; being ambitious is a prerequisite for running
a company. This psychological theme is what motivates most if not all major
business entrepreneurs. Edgar, Jr.'s relationship to his family is not particularly
special in that all families have family politics, no matter how successful, and
the Bronfmans were no different. What was special was the massive losses he
suffered. How could he have been so wrong? What really caused this mistake?
Edgar Bronfinan, Jr. chose to bet his family's wealth on a risky
proposition---that the entertainment industry would provide him with financial
success beyond that which his father had achieved by his investment in Dupont
Chemicals. He assumed that, over the next years, Entertainment Company
would become a hot sector in the marketplace. He anticipated the merger frenzy
to sweep the entertainment industry. If he were right, his decision would prove
brilliant and highly lucrative, far more so than the billion plus he had make for
Seagram's coffers by acquiring and then divesting Tropicana. By contrast,
holding Dupont stock and receiving periodic dividends was a far less risky
business proposition, and potentially less profitable. Dupont's stock fluctuated
far less than most, especially the more volatile entertainment industry stocks like
AOL/Time Warner, Viacom, Disney, and others. In retrospect, Edgar, Jr. was
right about entertainment stocks in 1995 when he bought MCA. Time Warner
was about to embark upon a hot streak, climbing 197% in the five years between
1995 and 2000. Viacom appreciated 125% in that time.
What happened to Seagram/MCA? Over the next five years, Seagram's
investment in entertainment doubled from $3 billion in 1997 to $6 billion by the
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year 2000. Edgar, Jr. obtained a stake in Barry Diller's company, USA
Interactive. His hand picked choices, Ron Meyer and Stacey Snider, at
Universal Studios, turned the studio into a motion picture powerhouse, which
was earning $34 million per year by 2000. Doug Morris and Jimmy lovine were
tapped to lead Universal Music Group, which brought about 38% more in profits
than the spirits and wine division, or $1 billion. Harvey Weinstein, CoChairperson, Miramax Films recently noted, "These management moves were
brilliant." 6 Edgar Bronfinan, Jr. was on his way toward his goal.
Still, he was cornered. Notwithstanding his great successes, Edgar Jr.
was unable to compete with Viacom or Time Warner. During this time, Disney
bought ABC; Viacom bought CBS; AOL bought Time Warner. Even though
Universal had better assets than Warner Music, Bronfnan was concerned that
AOL would deliver Time Warner music and film content to millions of AOL
subscribers, something he could not do. Edgar, Jr. decided that his company had
to find a partner to distribute its artists' works to the masses. He needed
Comcast or Yahoo. He entered into talks with News Corporation and Comcast.
He was willing to sell Seagram's liquor assets in order to make himself
competitive with Disney, Viacom, or AOL-Time Warner.
The Vivendi Seagram merger fiasco
The strategy inplace, Edgar, Jr. approached the coming millennium in
the company of a new suitor: Jean Marie Messier, a French dealmaker and CEO
of Vivendi. The plan Edgar Jr. and Jean Marie had devised was to bring
together Universal Studios and Universal Music Group with Vivendi's European
Internet, cable television, and wireless divisions. Edgar, Jr. would have to divest
Seagram's spirits division. The deal, struck on June 20, 2000, was an exchange
of stock, valued at $34 billion. Edgar, Jr. agreed to trade his Seagram shares for
Vivendi's stock. Seagram, which was worth $13 billion in 1995, now was being
traded for shares of Vivendi stock, fixed at $77 per share. Edgar, Jr. was to
become Vivendi's vice chairman, second in command behind Messier. He was
to be responsible for its Internet and music divisions.
But it was not Edgar, Jr. who achieved collegial status with the likes of
Rupert Murdock, Steven Case, Jerry Levine, and the select few of media mogul
celebrity. Over the next fifteen months, by August 2001, the stock at Vivendi
dropped nearly one third. In the meantime, Messier went on a buying spree. He
purchased Houghton Mifflin, and USA networks, the latter in a deal which
valued Seagram's former television assets at $10 billion, considered far too
costly by Edgar, Jr. Messier lost $1 billion in options trading as well. Charles
Bronfinan, Edgar, Jr.'s uncle, resigned his seat on the board in disgust. By July
2002, the damage caused by Messier was complete. By the time of his highly
public ouster from the company, Vivendi was in trouble. Vivendi sold
6 Harvey

Weinstein, "Crediting Edgar Bronfinan," in Fortune Magazine, Letters to the Editor,

January 20, 2003.
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Houghton Mifflin to raise cash, and sought a bank line of credit of $1 billion to
survive.
When Charles Bronfman finally dumped 2.7 million shares in August
2002, Vivendi was selling for $12 a share, down over eighty percent from the
share price at the time of the merger. Edgar, Sr. and Edgar, Jr. had sold $1
billion worth of Vivendi stock following the 90-day lock up period in 2001--ten
times the amount sold by Charles Bronfman at that time. Today the goal is to
repair the damage caused between the American (Edgar, Jr. and Edgar, Sr.) and
Canadian (Charles) branches of the Bronfnan family, and get the stock price up
at Vivendi. At one point in 2002, Edgar, Jr. had considered a plan to spin off an
IPO to be run by Barry Diller, CEO of Vivendi's Universal Entertainment. It
would create a company almost identical to the one Edgar, Jr. built at Seagram
before the Vivendi deal.

A Behavioral Finance Analysis
Behavioral finance, and its focus upon decision-making heuristics,
would analyze Edgar, Jr. decisions by: (1) undertaking a "reference point"
analysis; (2) identifying specific heuristic thinking errors each was vulnerable
to, and comparing these decision heuristics to others embraced by their fathers;
(3) evaluating the basis of their willingness to seek risk, and; (4) making
recommendations to prevent future decision bias.
1. Reference point analysis.
Behavioral finance's descriptive, empirically derived, approach to
decision choice under uncertainty is applied through Prospect Theory. Prospect
Theory frames decision-making by recognizing that decision success and failure
is subjective; decision outcomes are dependent upon a comparison to a reference
point. Gains and losses are defined relative to a reference point. A simple
example illustrates Prospect Theory.
Two investors, Bob and Sue, have purchased two different stocks each
at 100. Bob observed the stock to appreciate to 240 in a matter of weeks, then to
plummet to 100, before it was sold at 102. Sue observed her stock to slowly
appreciate from 100 to 102 in the same time period and then she sold the stock
at 102. Even though each investor has made two dollars per share, Prospect
Theory indicates that Bob and Sue do not have the same attitude about their
decision to sell at 102. Bob will experience the sale as a loss because he has
fixed a reference point above 102 (somewhere closer to 200 or more), whereas
Sue experiences the sale as a gain because her reference point is 100.
Under Prospect Theory, the value of an asset, like a stock, is not
regarded in absolute terms. Prospect Theory rejects the presumption that people
behave optimally by choosing to be insensitive to small changes of their wealth.
Instead, investors, even extremely wealthy investors, remain sensitive to
changes in a specific asset value or their portfolio wealth, because of implicit
reference points. Their focus is gains and losses, i.e., changes in wealth, instead
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of states of wealth.7 What matters to them is how the stock performs relative to a
benchmark or reference point.8
Edgar, Jr. redefined what it meant to achieve success. He chose a new
and similar personal point of reference, different from that of his own father, and
more akin to that of the then current CEO celebrities in the entertainment sector
of the marketplace. Edgar, Jr. defined success as assembling an expansive
media conglomerate, which owned both content and delivery apparatus (i.e., to
achieve convergence). That was his personal reference point. He compared
himself to Gerald Levine, Sumner Redstone, and Mark Eisner, the celebrities at
Time Warner, Viacom, and Disney, who were actively involved in concluding
mega merger deals. Edgar, Jr. wanted to be like Gerald, Sumner, or Mark. If he
could do that, he would be a success. Whatever else he had already achieved
mattered little in relation to this reference point. As the chief executive, Edgar,
Jr., was ready to focus upon the big picture, to become a visionary. The deal
making in the marketplace struck by media moguls was a vivid, dramatic
illustration of what it took to be successful.
The essence of a behavioral decision analysis is found in the distinction
between Edgar, Jr.'s and Edgar, Sr.'s points of reference. Each approached the
information cascade that dominated the Internet bubble by a "confirmatory"
bias. Each one identified the existing information in a manner that confirmed or
justified his end goal: whether that was to transition Seagram into entertainment
or grow Seagram larger as a liquor distributing company. In doing so, each one
revealed a particular cognitive heuristic. It is not accurate to say that the
distinction between Edgar, Jr. and his father was that Edgar the younger was
more ambitious, more aggressive, more willing to take risks. According to
Prospect Theory, reference points define decisions. For example, Edgar, Jr. was
a billion dollar success, were he to have chosen to regard his decision to buy and
later sell Tropicana as having been career defining in the same way that his
father's decision to obtain Dupont stock was career defining. Unfortunately, in
retrospect, for Edgar, Jr. that reference point (making a billion dollars for
Seagram) was not significant within the point of reference he had chosen,
whereas it would have been very relevant to his father, who valued steady
growth.
'Gary Belsky and Thomas Gilovich illustrate the point by noting that the typical head of an
American family, with a net worth of $200,000, does not see a $500 loss or gain as being one-fourth
of one percent of the overall financial asset worth. Instead he or she sees it as $500 that she did or
is the actual gaining or
didn't have five minutes before she lost or gained it. They conclude, "[i]t
losing--and our feelings about it--that matter more to us, rather than how those gains or losses leave
us in terms of our overall financial position." See, Gary Belsky and Thomas Gilovich, Why Smart
People Make Big Money Mistakes. Simon and Schuster Press, 1999 (p. 56).
8
For example: an investment advisor is trying to decide whether to recommend Johnson and Johnson
or a start up biogenetic company to a client. Both companies do well after the recommendation to
purchase Johnson and Johnson is made. However, the start up company outperforms by doubling its
share price whereas Johnson and Johnson earns a solid 15% return over the next three months.
Rather than celebrate a 15% return, the client responds coolly and concludes the advisor made the
wrong recommendation. In retrospect, the broker regrets having openly made the comparison prior
to recommending Johnson and Johnson.
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2. Heuristic decision analysis.
Cognitive decision analysis presumes that people simplify decisions,
relying upon information- processing short cuts or mental heuristics rules of
thumb. Heuristics play a role because people don't have the time or analytic
capacity to optimize decisions. After all, optimal decisions are time consuming,
requiring exhaustive research. Each and every decision option must be
extensively evaluated on numerous criteria by sophisticated methodology. In
actuality the marketplace does not permit decision makers the freedom to
effectively process the mountain of information available to make fully
informed decisions. Their decisions therefore are bounded by such limitations
and are sub-optimal. For example, Richard Shiller attributed market volatility to
problems of bounded rationality. He described market movements as being a
"reluctant slave" to both the over-reaction and under-reaction of investors. 9 His
work indicated that markets were like the story of Goldilocks and the Three
Bears: market sentiment was either a little too hot or a little too cold when
fixing stock prices. Professor Shiller emphasized the importance of social fads
and specifically the herd mentality in describing investor behavior in the stock
market.
As behavioral finance came into prominence, the focus shifted away
from optimal decision making theory toward an effort to "enrich our economic
understanding by incorporating what we know about human nature into financial
models."' 0 Research centered on uncovering the many ways in which investors
depart from optimal decision-making, referred to as "anomalous behavior" by
efficient market hypothesis adherents. The existence of anomalies pointed to the
significance of investor overconfidence, excessive trading, and over- and underreaction in pricing stocks to explain marketplace volatility. Further, marketplace
anomalies were regarded with interest because, if these deviations followed a
predictable pattern, they could be anticipated and exploited to reap benchmarkbeating returns. Assisted by psychologists Amos Tversky and David Kahneman,
work in decision theory helped to blur the boundaries between economists,
psychologists, and financial analysts, and a paradigm shift appeared imminent."
Prestigious academic finance researchers turned their attention to identifying
anomalies in the market place, producing articles in high profile journals with
names like "High Stock Returns before Holidays: Existence and Evidence on
Possible Causes," "Winter Blues: Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) and Stock
9Richard Shiller, Irrational Exuberance Princeton University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey,
2000.
10Brad Barber and Terrance Odean, "The Courage of Misguided Convictions: The Trading
Behavior of Individual Investors," July 1999, p. 1. This article was found in the JSTOR electronic
archive at www.jstor.org/joumals.
"Professor Nau described the times as follows. Each new proof of empirical violations of the Von
Nuemann-Morgenstem or Savage axioms, and each new relaxation of the axioms to accommodate
those violations, was greeted with intense interest. Bernoulli centuries ago reasoned that
notwithstanding the fact that money has absolute value, the utility of money declines with increased
wealth, such that an increase of$100 to a portfolio having only $100 means something significantly
more than an increase of$100 to a portfolio of one million dollars.
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Returns," "Home Bias at Home:
Local Equity Preference in Domestic
Portfolios," "The Halloween Indicator, Sell in May and Go Away: Another
Puzzle," "Good Day Sunshine:
Stock Returns
and the Weather," and
'2
"Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies."'
Edgar Bronfinan, Jr.'s decisions to expand to achieve convergence
between communications and entertainment may have been tainted by cognitive
bias. Edgar, Jr. may have unrealistically simplified his thinking and in doing so,
may have made sub-optimal, bad decisions, having grave consequences. If he
had chosen to avert his thinking pattern to first include an analysis of his
decision-heuristics, horrific losses also may have been averted. It appears that
Edgar Bronfman, Jr. may have made heuristic-thinking errors, referred to
specifically as: the representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic, and
insensitivity to the endowment effect. Bronfinan, Jr. also appears to have
abandoned the natural human tendency to be risk aversive. He may have done
so because of the "house money effect." As a result, his willingness to take
these particular decision risks made him highly vulnerable.
Representativeness heuristic, in statistical analysis also known as the
"Law of Small Numbers,"' 13 is a tendency by decision makers to overstate
commonly held attitudes derived from inadequate (small) sampling. Sampling
is defined as discrete prior experiences that help form an opinion. It is presumed
that the larger the sampling and/or the longer the time period for sampling, the
more accurate the sample will be in describing the population from which it is
drawn. For example, the Vanguard Total Stock Mutual Fund, containing 5000
individual stock companies randomly drawn from the marketplace, is far more
likely to reflect the marketplace than the S&P 500, containing 500 stocks of
large capitalization companies. Thus, the smaller the sampling or shorter the
period of sampling, the more likely the findings are related to chance rather than
a true reflection of the targeted population. At the time of Edgar, Jr.'s forays
into communications and entertainment, his analysis was in line with the then
positive investor sentiment toward both entertainment and communication sector
stocks. This was no different than the existing public's fascination with
enhanced communication and entertainment (with reality simulation and special
effects) delivered through computers, even wireless devices. Harboring
recognition of the popular positive regard for entertainment and communications
sectors beginning in 1995 and extending over the next five years, investors
began to behave as an unthinking herd. It is likely that Edgar Jr. was convinced
12Robert A. Ariel, "High Stock Returns before Holidays: Existence and Evidence on Possible
Causes, Journal of Finance Vol 65, No. 5, 1980, p. 1611-1626. The following articles were found in
the electronic library established by JSTOR located on the World Wide Web at
www.jstor.org/journals. Mark J. Kamstra, Lisa A. Kramer, and Maurice D. Levi, "Winter Blues:
Seasonal Affective Disorder (SAD) and Stock Returns," September 11, 2000; Joshua D. Coval and
Tobias J. Moskowitz, "Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic Portfolios,; Sven
Bouman, Ben Jacobsen, "The Halloween Indicator, Sell in May and Go Away: Another Puzzle,"
September 1999; David Hirshleifer and Tyler Shurnway, "Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and
the Weather," March 28, 2001; Alon Bray and J. B. Heaton, "Competing Theories of Financial
Anomalies," January 2000.
13Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman coined the phrase "the Law of Small Numbers."
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that he had accurately observed investor herding, and presumed the herd would
run toward the new next thing, convergence. Actually, the herd, lacking any
vision into the future, stampeded off the cliff. Unfortunately, it appears that his
sampling of business trends persuaded Edgar, Jr. to conclude convergence was
the future. His sampling of the marketplace trends may have been limited to
events that were taking place over the time period leading up to the new
millennium, rather than other times when the market was not affected by mania.
To the extent that this is so, a failure to review a representative sampling of
marketplace behavior would have made Edgar, Jr. vulnerable to the
representativeness heuristic: an over-reliance upon inadequate sampling may
have led to errors in judgment. Edgar, Jr. was swept up by the herding
mentality and positive investor sentiment of the times.
Edgar, Jr. was tantalized. He appeared to have relied excessively on
the strength of the information signal and insufficiently on the weight of the
signal. The importance of merging now, "the others are doing it, and I don't
want to be left out," may have taken precedence over substantive considerations
or the weight of the signal. Consistent with the availability heuristic, he
appeared to have embraced the prevailing view to grab market share, even if it
meant to diminish profits or create debt. Prior large merger catastrophes were
pushed far back, away from public consciousness, hidden in the history of the
1970s. Edgar, Jr. may have over-weighted the importance of a few just
concluded merger transactions (i.e. AOL and Time Warner, Viacom and CBS).
The Law of Small Numbers may have led Edgar, Jr. to make the deal. He
appeared to have under-weighted a well-recognized principle in business:
mega-mergers between large corporations do not generally succeed. The more
complicated the project, the more numerous the details, as with a merger
between two large independent cultures, the more likely it is to fail. This is
known as the conjunction fallacy.
Edgar, Jr. appears to have broken from the decision heuristics used by
his father, which had initially guided them. Specifically, Edgar, Jr.'s decision
heuristics differed from those of his father beginning with the MCA deal. For
Edgar, Jr., to achieve success meant to learn a new business and enter a
capricious, highly volatile sector of the market. Edgar, Sr. had been comfortable
with defining success as akin to growing Seagram, expanding its market share
while maintaining its identity as the premier liquor distributing company. This
tendency, to build upon what already has gone before, is an example of the
endowment effect or anchor heuristic. Anchoring is the tendency to make
decisions by holding on to one's traditions, as well as a failure to integrate new
and critical information. For example, the anchoring heuristic is a bias in favor
of what has previously worked or what is owned. The endowment effect
explains that investors have a more difficult time selling off an asset previously
purchased and contained in the portfolio. They over weight an asset already in
the investor's portfolio (endowment). An investor subjectively values the asset
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more if it is already in his portfolio than he would if it were not in his portfolio
but available for purchase.14
The endowment heuristic appears to have led Edgar, Sr. to conclude
that selling Dupont would be a mistake. He had been unwilling to sell Dupont
stock, a boring old world company, whose yearly dividends were as lackluster as
they were predictable. If the two Bronfmans were asked in 1995 whether
Dupont was a good stock to own, the father and the son would likely have given
different answers because each was using a different heuristic to guide his
decision. After all, the elder Bronfinan secured the family's wealth by
ownership of Dupont stock. It was at the center of their success, that is, his
personal reference point for good leadership.
3. Overconfidence and a willingness to seek risk
Edgar, Jr. appeared to have embraced a willingness to "dump out" or
gloss over detail in favor of the big picture fallacy and substitute overconfidence
and risk seeking for critical analyses. Overconfidence and risk seeking appear
to have been reflected in a willingness to: (1) enter a volatile area of the
marketplace, (2) concentrate assets under one visionary rubric like
"convergence" and fail to diversify or hedge, (3) choose not to protect against a
downside risk, (4) be in a "hot area," (5) believe in having a "hot hand," and (6)
"partner up" and make deals. These attitudes of overconfidence may have led
to a self-deception allowing an avoidance of the natural tendency toward risk
aversion. Their aggressive posture, and seduction by the current fad, may have
been the result of the "house money" effect (see discussion, infra).
Risk aversion is the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to
reductions than to increases in their level of well-being. Investors are risk
seeking with losses, and risk aversive with gains. A simple illustration helps to
make the point.
For example, an investor must choose one of two options. Alternative
A is a fifty percent chance of gaining $1000; whereas alternative B is a sure gain
of $500. Expected utility theory predicts each option is equally attractive, given
that the expected values of each (500 = /2 x 1000) are the same. In practice,
most people will choose certainty, "B" (84% vs. 16%). Prospect Theory would
predict this result because a sure gain is consistent with the tendency to be risk
aversive with gains. When it comes to losses, investors will avoid a sure loss,
say of $500, in favor of a 50% chance of losing 1000, 50% of losing nothing, in
an effort to break even (69% to 31%).
Richard Thaler summed investors' thinking by suggesting that
investors would become more cautious about losses (risk aversive), but would
likely accept a risk that would give them a chance of getting back to break-even,
which they would regard as very attractive (risk seeking). 15 Investors are prone
14Consistent with the endowment effect, portfolio managers weight the potential loss from an
unfavorable sale of a stock more heavily than the potential gain from a positive buy in a new stock.
15Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle,"
The Ouarterlv Journal of Economics February 1995.
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to sell their winning stocks and hold paper losses (that latter situation is known
as the disposition effect).
Edgar, Jr. had participated in the marketplace ground swell and
benefited greatly prior from his decisions to aggressively pursue convergence.
He had made gains, based upon good decisions. According to Prospect Theory,
prior gains should have led him to be risk aversive with their gains as his father
had been. But that was not the case. Why not?
The answer is found in an understanding of the impact of a history of
prior gains upon decision-making.
The "House Money" Frame: Dynamic Loss Aversion
Although investors are generally risk aversive with gains, the "house
money" frame proposes that investors are risk seeking with newly and easily
acquired money. The "house money" frame was derived simply enough from a
card game. Richard Thaler and his colleagues in the Department of Economics
at Cornell University frequently played low stakes poker games. Thaler
observed that players with winnings from previous games bet more
aggressively, "feeling perhaps that they could only lose the money that they had
just won. In casinos,
gamblers call these winnings 'house money' (as opposed to
'real money')."' 16
The investors are ahead, although their behaviors are
different--one motivated by risk aversion, the other by risk seeking behavior.
The distinction is that risk aversion occurs with one-shot gambles; the house
money frame presumes a sequence of prior winning gambles.
Richard Thaler and Eric J. Johnson' 7 investigated whether investors
who had already experienced a sequence of profitable (or alternatively losing)
investment decisions were more risk seeking (or alternatively risk aversive).
Thaler and Johnson concluded that the degree and extent of the loss aversion
experienced by the investor depended on the history of prior investment decision
successes or failures. They found that the level of risk aversion is reduced by a
prior investment gain, which they labeled the house money effect, due to the
investor's increased willingness to take risks when ahead.' 8 Kahneman and
' 6Richard Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics Russell Sage Foundation Press, 1992, p. xv.
17Richard Thaler and Eric J. Johnson, "Gambling with house money and trying to break even: the
effect of prior outcomes in risky choice," Management Science 36 (1990) 643-660.
18Id. Thaler and Johnson asked an investor to assume that he/she was already $300 richer prior to
the onset of the experiment. As noted, nearly three out of four respondents selected the certainty of
the first option, a sure gain of $100, indicating risk aversion, whereas approximately a quarter of the
respondents had chosen the risk seeking choice (see Example 1). In each of the options available the
investors did not risk losses. They merely risked omitting future gain opportunities; the chance to
lock in what had been a paper gain. Following successful prior gains, investors behaved in an
expected risk aversive manner. Prospect Theory predicts this, even though the expected values for
each option are equivalent, and not predicted by Efficient Markets Hypothesis. If given the choice to
make a further selection (play on) or keep the already won $300, as little as thirty percent of the
respondents preferred to keep the $300 previously obtained. This is a smaller percentage than was
expected for anticipated gains (i.e. a smaller than expected percentage were risk aversive) Given the
Prospect Theory presumption that investors are risk aversive with gains, what accounts for the low

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol2/iss1/1

14

Raifman: A Family Tale: Behavioral Finance and the Seagram-Vivendi Merger

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS & LAW

Tversky's research suggested that people were willing to take risks in order to
avoid being tagged with a loss; Thaler and Johnson's research suggested that if
risk seeking efforts to avoid a loss were unsuccessful and the investor
compounded the loss, he would subsequently suffer a severe risk aversion.
Likewise, according to Thaler and Johnson, following a series of successful
investment choices, an investor would be more risk seeking than would be
predicted by Prospect Theory. While a loss that comes after a series of prior
gains is regarded as less painful than without the prior gains, because the loss is
cushioned by the earlier gains. Whereas, a loss that follows after a series of19prior
losses is regarded as more painful than if not cushioned by the prior losses.
In summary, Thaler and Johnson have shown the importance of an
investor's prior success or failure, noting that extreme success or prior failure
builds upon itself edging the investor toward risk seeking behavior. Eventually,
unless the investor withdraws his winnings, losses will neutralize, or overwhelm
any prior gains or merely compound prior losses. When that occurs, the investor
is likely to become very risk aversive. That may have been what happened to
Edgar, Jr. Edgar, Jr. was very successful in prior business dealings and had
amassed large amounts of capital. He risked this newly gained capital, along
with their financial legacies, on overly risky decisions.
Once he experienced the series of graduated declines in the shares of
his acquired company, Edgar, Jr. appeared to have become very sensitive to risk.
Edgar and his father sold a large portion of his stock portfolio in Vivendi when
they recognized the risk of continuing to concentrate their wealth in the
company. The "sunk cost effect" would explain Charles Bronfinan's decision to
remain with the Vivendi stock investment after recognizing that the stock price
had started its downward course. As noted above, Charles reluctantly embraced
Edgar, Jr.'s merger with Vivendi, expressing his doubts to his brother. However,
once the deal was struck, Charles failed to sell the majority of Vivendi shares.
Like his brother, Edgar, Sr. he was faced with an uncomfortable decision:
whether or not to sell the Vivendi stock. Charles' decision to maintain
percentage of risk aversive respondents? This conclusion can be interpreted to mean investors are
risk seeking with money that they have previously gained, which they frame as not theirs but the
"house money," whereas, if they regard the gains as their own money, they would be risk aversive.
Assume that the same question is framed differently. That is, say the investor has previously gained
a certain $300 on a prior task, rather than merely receiving the money. Further, assume that the
prospective choice is between refusing to participate (being risk aversive) and flipping a coin that
either adds $390 if the outcome is heads or adds $210 if the outcome is tails (see Example 3). Is this
a risk seeking option? Here the choices are two competing winning certainties. And yet, when
compared to the option above, a larger percentage of investors choose to retain the $300, a risk
aversive posture. They framed option 2, between two competing certainties, as if there was risk
involved. Finally, the last frame is provided as follows: "Assume yourself to be richer by $500 than
you were yesterday. You have to choose between a sure loss of$100, or a fifty percent chance to
lose nothing and a 50% chance to lose $200."(Example 4). The expected values for these risk
options are the same. The results diverge from the expectation of a 50-50 split. Because of prior
winnings, investors are less inclined to be risk seeking, as expected by Prospect Theory, though two
thirds of the respondents were.
19Richard Thaler and Eric Johnson, "Gambling with the house money and trying to break even: The
effects of prior outcomes on risky choice," Management Science 36, 643-660.
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ownership over the shares was influenced by the sunk-cost effect. Sunk cost is
akin to the endowment effect. It presumes that prior decisions are not likely to
be overturned (as is the case with the endowment effect) once those decisions
have required a personal or financial commitment. Sunk cost is the additional
experience of pain associated with selling a loser, referred to as closing an
account at a loss. Unlike his brother, Edgar, Sr. and Edgar, Jr. did sell a large
portion of their Vivendi shares when it was evident that the shares were going to
continue to drop further. They "closed the losing account" which is recognized
as most painful of all decisions.
4. Recommendations
By relying upon the application of behavioral finance, especially the
influential work of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on prospect theory,
several theories may be articulated concerning Edgar Bronfinan, Jr., and his
father. This analysis concludes that Edgar Jr. was likely vulnerable to the
representativeness heuristic, and this tendency distinguished him from his father
who was more comfortable with the anchoring heuristic and the endowment
effect. Edgar, Jr. appeared to have overestimated the importance of the AOL
Time Warner merger, as well as business models used by Disney and Viacom
that celebrated convergence, acquisitions, and the "vision thing," that is, reliance
upon the big (global) picture and avoidance of details (conjunction fallacy).
Edgar, Jr. may well have been seduced by the then popular marketplace fad that
emphasized market share over market profits.
In retrospect, had Edgar, Jr. undertaken an analysis of his decision
heuristics, he might have avoided the decision he ultimately made. He may have
recognized a commitment to ride the convergence train and not be "left behind,"
a desire to be viewed as a visionary and leave a personal legacy, and a
willingness to bet the company on their vision of the future. These tendencies
have one thing in common, the representativeness heuristic: a predisposition to
make decisions without an adequate basis for predicting the decision outcomes.
For example, in embracing convergence, Edgar, Jr. appeared to have under
weighted or minimized available knowledge of failed business efforts. Disney's
Michael Eisner failed at a convergence strategy, which cost him dearly. Mr.
Eisner launched the "Go To" Internet portal, which was a failure. To his credit,
although he was willing to acquire ABC as a distribution platform for Disney
content, which has not panned out, Mr. Eisner accepted the "Go To" Internet
portal loss, and chose not to bet the company on this untried Internet based
convergence strategy.
How would I have advised Edgar, Jr. at the time he was initially
contemplating convergence strategies for his companies? Based upon an
assessment of the decision heuristics employed, I would have made the
following points. First, increasing levels of personal confidence show no
correlations with great decision success. Hardwired into our brains is a
predisposition to be optimistic. Second, many investors believe that they can
time the financial markets when the overwhelming amount of evidence is to the
contrary. The human brain is reluctant to receive information that will cause
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anxiety (cognitive dissonance), and underestimates the range of variability
around an outcome they foresee. Third, people typically give too much weight to
recent experience. Fourth, people take greater risks when they have previously
done well. Fifth, how people frame a question often predetermines the response.
Finally, there is a tendency to focus myopically upon short-term results.
Primarily, it is the application of these behavioral finance platitudes
that counts. "The devil is in the details." Edgar, Jr. could have incorporated into
his decision making process a behavioral finance decision tool designed to
detect inherent human predispositions toward decision error. The decision tool,
the Bias Avoidance Model ("BAM"),2 ° would be part of a new framework for
evaluating crucial business decisions. While decisions regarding acquisitions
and mergers are crossroads type decisions that would benefit from the use of this
behavioral finance decision tool, the fact is that most decisions regarding
introduction of a new product, annual budgets, and/or five year plans, etc. are
vulnerable to human thinking frailties, and would benefit as well. In sum, the
bias avoidance model behavioral finance decision tool would act as an
accountability check to minimize the risk of decision heuristics or bias
impacting upon the business case evaluation 2' by consultants or in-house
committee.
As is the usual case, business leaders rely upon consultants or in house
committees infected by confirmation bias.22 When formulating the pros and
cons of a business decision, the tone and decision analysis inherently reflects
either a sympathetic or critical bias toward the project through choosing to
downplay or highlight potential decision risks. Confirmatory bias is most
common because consultants or employees who sense interest in the acquisition
by decision makers will avoid displeasing the decision makers by choosing to
confirm their client's interest, essentially justifying the decision that they
perceive to have already been made. Confirmation bias is an insidious problem
for business companies, which spend significant time and resources for
essentially little or no value.
Confirmation bias can be avoided through the use of a behavioral
finance decision tool to detect faulty decision-making. The tool would achieve
the following results: (1) identify the heuristic decision biases and offer
suggestions to avoid the types of cognitive thinking errors they typical produce;
(2) clarify the specific frame of reference used by the decision maker which
reveals his or her risk comfort level; and (3) guard against common human

20The Bias Avoidance Model ("BAM") is a decision tool adapted from Behavioral Finance research.
My colleague, David Miller, and I have developed a checklist measure to assist in optimizing
business decisions.
21"Business case" is defined as the rationale advanced by management for a decision, such as its
benefit to the company, such as, its synergies, additional revenues, etc. It is the write up that sets out
the benefits of the deal weighed against its potential risks.
22Confirmation bias is often associated with an investment broker's role of providing an investor a
person to blame if the investment goes poorly, though rarely someone to praise when the investment
goes well.
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decision errors, such as disposition effect, hot hand fallacy,23 the problem of

closing an account out at a loss, sunk costs, house money effect, endowment
effect, risk aversion, etc.
As noted above, Edgar, Jr. appears to have been prone to making
representativeness heuristic errors. The application of the behavioral finance
decision tool to Edgar, Jr. points to a specific intervention strategy, which makes
it possible to safeguard decisions from the deleterious effects of this kind of
cognitive thinking error. The work of Gird Gigerenzer and his colleagues has
addressed the heuristic in which decision makers are seduced by the current fad,
and become prone to decision errors of under weighting evidence that opposes
the popular fad.24 Gigerenzer evaluated the conclusion that decision makers
make consistent and predictable errors based on the availability and
He found that decision makers prone to
representativeness heuristics.
representativeness heuristics that choose to frame the decision outcomes in

probabilities, rather than frequencies, made a difference.25

Thinking with probabilities differs from thinking with frequencies. For
example, the public response to exposure to minute amounts of chemicals in air,
food, and water is different when portrayed by frequency statistics, i.e. out of
one million people exposed, there will be one additional cancer death, rather
than probability measurements, i.e. each exposed individual has an additional
chance of .000001 or .0001% of getting cancer. Purchase and Slovic 26 (1999)
found that frequency statistics of exposure risk frighten people. Torrey and
Zdanowicz 27 likewise noted that advocates for longer hospital stays bent on
frightening the general public about violence by people with mental disorder
frame their arguments in terms of frequencies rather than probabilities:
"Approximately 1000 homicides a year are committed nationwide by seriously
mentally ill individuals who are not taking their medication," and not "the
23The hot hand fallacy is another example of being fooled by randomness. The often drawn, but
inaccurate conclusion is that the investor is successful in streaks, as with a hitting streak. In
actuality, what is interpreted as success or skill is rather a random distribution not easily detectible to
the observer.
2Gird Gigerenzer, Why the Distinction between Single Event Probabilities and Frequencies is
Important for Psychology (and Vice Versa), in Subjective Probability 1 30-159 (G. Wright & P.
Ayton, eds. 1994). Gird Gigerenzer, The Psychology of Good Judgment: Frequency Formats and
Simple Algorithms, 16 Medical Decision Making: Ulrich Hoffrage, How to Improve Bayesian
Reasoning Without Instruction: Frequency Formats, 102 PSYCH. REv. 684 (1995); Gird Gigerenzer
& Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, 103
PSYCH. REv. 650 (1996); Gird Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart (1999).
25Gigerenzer's found that decisions made from probabilistic reasoning are very sensitive to the
format in which information is presented. So that if a question which calls for a probability answer is
posed, such as, "what is the chance that a person who tests positively for a disease actually has that
condition? The answer is often biased by the way the question is asked. On the other hand, if the
question posed requires the decision maker to judge event frequencies, such as, "how many people
who test positive for the disease will actually have the condition?" then the biases are less
influential.
26Pruchase, 1.F. H. & Slovic, P., "Quantitative risk assessment breeds fear," Human and Ecological
Risk Assessment 5,445-453 (1999).
27
Torrey, E. and Zdanowicz, M. "Why de-institutionalization turned deadly," Wall Street Journal,
August 4, 1998.
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annual likelihood of being killed by such an individual is approximately
.0000036 (1000 deaths out of the total population of the US or 273,000,000)."
The point is that it would have been easier for Edgar, Jr. to have
ignored the evidence that mergers between companies of two separate and
distinct cultures do not work, if that evidence was presented in terms of
probabilities (i.e., out of the largest mega mergers, ninety percent of mega
mergers will fail to succeed). However, by revising the statement slightly to
emphasize event frequencies, (i.e., of the ten largest mega mergers that have
been completed, nine mega mergers have been unsuccessful), Gigerenzer has
shown that a decision maker would value and incorporate the information far
more. In effect, it would grab his attention and promote the desired fear arousal
needed to displace the representativeness heuristic. If Edgar, Jr. had asked:
"How many people who try this type of merger are actually successful?" and
heard, "One out of ten," he would have been more likely to avoid the merger,
labeling it as a risky choice. The more commonly asked question is: "[W]hat is
the chance (probability) of this anticipated merger will result in a business
success?" The problem is an overconfident decision maker won't recognize the
small probability of success associated with mega merger activity, by suggesting
that he will beat the odds because he is special.
Paul Slovic, John Monahan, and Donald MacGregor,28 in a study of
communicating violence risk assessment of mental patients, conclude: "[O]ur
findings suggest that probabilities and frequencies each come with a complex set
of advantages and disadvantages as formats.. .Neither is inherently superior to,
or less susceptible to bias, than the other." They recommend that decision
makers employ multiple formats. Thus, when deciding to embark upon a mega
merger type acquisition, Edgar, Jr. might be presented with the following
statements, "Of every 10 mergers similar to that contemplated here, one is
expected to succeed. In other words, this anticipated merger is estimated to have
a ten percent likelihood of success" --- and a 90 percent likelihood of failure.
In order to best protect executives, they need to recognize the
conditions under which different heuristics can be muted, their decisions from
cognitive error. It is easy to identify decision errors with the benefit of hindsight.
The goal is to establish a preventive, protective decision making strategy to
mitigate against specific decision heuristics. As noted above, employment of a
behavioral finance decision tool can help minimize the pernicious effects of
representativeness or availability heuristics, and insulate decision makers from
problems of "hot hand" fallacy, endowment effect, house money effect, and
other behavioral finance constructs. This approach is superior to an attempt to
analyze traits of character, such as honesty, or traits of personality, 2 9 such as an
28Paul Slovic, John Monahan, and Donald G. MacGregor, "Violence Risk Assessment and Risk
Communication: The Effects of using actual cases, providing instruction, and employing probability
vs. frequency formats," Law and Human Behavior. Vol. 24, No. 3, 2000.
29 Joanthan

Myers has described several personality classification systems applied to investor
behavior. For example, the Barnwell Two Way Model classifies investors either as passive or
active. Developed in 1987 by Marilyn MacGruder Bamewell of the MacGruder Agency, this simply
format is at work in many circles today. Similarly, the Bailard, Biehl and Kaiser Five Way model
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attempt to categorize executives as adventurous, guardian, achievers, rugged
individualist, etc.; a strategy we believe to be fraught with problems.

approaches investors as having five personalities: adventurers, celebrities, individualists, guardians,
straight arrows. Kathleen Gumery of the Financial Psychological Corporation identifies nine
money personalities including: safety players, entrepreneurs, optimists, hunters, achievers,
perfectionists, producers, high rollers, and money masters. The Psychonomic Investor Profile relies
upon six personalities: cautious, emotional, technical, busy, casual, and informed.
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